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Abstract
Interoception (the ability to sense what’s going on inside one’s body) is considered integral to many higher-order cognitive 
processes. Some have speculated that impaired interoception may underpin some features of ASD. Yet, in Experiment 1, 
we found no evidence of a between-group difference in either cardiac or respiratory interoceptive accuracy among 21 adults 
with ASD and 21 matched controls. Bayesian analyses suggested the data strongly supported the null hypothesis. In Experi-
ment 2, we measured cardiac interoceptive accuracy in 21 children with ASD and 21 matched controls. Here interoceptve 
accuracy was significantly diminished in the ASD group and was associated with a moderate-to-large effect size. Results 
suggest early interoception difficulties are resolved or compensated for by adulthood in people with ASD.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder · Interoception · Developmental disorders · Interoceptive accuracy
Introduction
Interoception refers to the sensation and representation of 
internal physiological signals, from organs such as the heart, 
stomach, lungs, and skin (Craig 2003). Its importance for 
survival is clear, but it is also increasingly seen as central 
to the development and organisation of higher-level cogni-
tion. For example, interoceptive accuracy (IA; the extent 
to which one can accurately identify interoceptive signals) 
has been found to be associated with ability in the domains 
of emotion-processing (Barrett et al. 2004; Pollatos et al. 
2005), decision-making (Dunn et al. 2010), self-regulation 
(Herbert et al. 2007), empathy (Fukushima et al. 2011) and 
theory of mind (Shah et al. 2017). These wide ranging asso-
ciations are in line with theories of embodied cognition that 
imply cognition is situated in bodily systems, and also point 
towards a role for interoception in both self and other pro-
cessing (Gallese 2007; Barrett and Simmons 2015; Barrett 
2017). This has led to a growing interest in the importance 
of interoception for disorders such as autism spectrum dis-
order (ASD).
ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder which is charac-
terised by severe behavioural impairments in social-commu-
nication and behavioural flexibility (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013). At the cognitive level, ASD is character-
ised by a difficulty with representing others’ mental states 
(theory of mind; Yirmiya et al. 1998) and with one’s own 
mental states (metacognition; e.g., Brosnan et al. 2016; 
Grainger et al. 2014; McMahon et al. 2016). Given recent 
findings linking interoception with higher level cognitive 
processes, such as theory of mind (Shah et al. 2017) and 
self-regulation (Herbert et al. 2007), it has been argued that 
difficulties with self-other processing in ASD may be the 
result of an underlying impairment in interoceptive aware-
ness. Quattrocki and Friston (2014) suggest that abnormal 
regulation of the oxytocin (a hormone linked to social bond-
ing) system in ASD may represent the biological basis of 
interoceptive impairments, which in turn result in problems 
linking more abstract concepts associated with these bodily 
signals. The idea is that a difficulty interpreting one’s own 
internal bodily signals early on may interfere with learning 
about the association between these low level bodily signals 
and other higher level feelings and thoughts, restricting the 
comprehension of oneself, which in turn would have similar 
effects on understanding other selves. However, empirical 
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studies of interoception in ASD have produced decidedly 
mixed results.
The majority of studies assessing interoception in ASD 
have used the heartbeat tracking task (Schandry 1981). In 
this task participants are asked to count the number of times 
they feel their heart beat in a given time interval without 
touching their body (i.e., feeling their pulse). The closer 
the participant’s reported number of heart beats is to their 
actual number of heart beats, the greater their interoceptive 
accuracy (IA). Six studies have used the heartbeat tracking 
task to measure interoceptive accuracy among individuals 
with ASD and findings are summarised in Table 1. In short, 
while diminished accuracy was observed in two studies, four 
studies found only negligible and non-significant between-
group differences suggesting that interoceptive accuracy 
is not impaired in ASD. One plausible explanation for the 
mixed findings is proposed by the alexithymia hypothesis 
(Bird and Cook 2013), which posits that difficulties process-
ing emotions are only evident in ASD individuals who also 
have high levels of alexithymia (defined as the inability to 
identify or describe ones emotions; Taylor 1984). According 
to this view interoceptive abnormalities are a central com-
ponent of alexithymia, not autism, and the suggested link 
between ASD and interoception can be explained by the high 
comorbidity of ASD and alexithymia (approximately 50% of 
ASD individuals also have alexithymia, five times that of the 
general public; Berthoz and Hill 2005), as opposed to ASD 
itself. Therefore, mixed results in the literature might emerge 
because levels of alexithymia vary from study to study, with 
only studies including ASD individuals with high levels of 
alexithymia likely to show a difference in interoception 
(Shah et al. 2016). 
A recent study tested this hypothesis directly comparing a 
group of autistic adults who manifested clinically significant 
levels of alexithymia (n = 27) with an age, sex, IQ, and ASD 
severity-matched group of autistic adults who did not meet 
criteria for alexithymia (n = 19) (Nicholson et al. 2018). Cru-
cially, there was no hint of any difference between these two 
sub-groups of ASD participants in terms of interoceptive 
accuracy, which provided clear evidence against the alex-
ithymia hypothesis. One of the potential limitations of this 
recent study, however, was the lack of a control task to guard 
against alternative explanations for the ASD group’s undi-
minished performance on the heartbeat tracking task. One 
potential difficulty with the heartbeat tracking task is that it 
might be possible to achieve apparently good interoceptive 
accuracy on it by counting silently. Given that the average 
heart rate is around 60 bpm, simply counting seconds inter-
nally could be sufficient to achieve high interoceptive accu-
racy even if one was unable to detect one’s heartbeat (Brener 
and Ring 2016). Therefore, in the current study we adopted a 
version of a time estimation control task (employed by Shah 
et al. 2016), which required participants to count silently 
during several unspecified periods and then estimate how 
many seconds had passed during the time. If participants 
with ASD (or neurotypical comparison participants) were 
compensating for underlying difficulties with interoception 
by silently counting, then performance on the time estima-
tion control task should be associated significantly with 
performance on the heartbeat tracking task and group dif-
ferences on the latter should appear once time estimation is 
controlled for.
A second more general limitation with the field as a 
whole concerns the reliance on the heartbeat tracking task 
as a single measure of interoceptive accuracy. The task is 
used frequently because it is relatively easy to administer, 
has good test–retest reliability (Mussgay et al. 1999), and is 
sensitive to individual differences (Christensen et al. 2018; 
Dunn et al. 2010; Garfinkel et al. 2015). However, some 
have questioned whether interoception is a unitary construct 
and suggested that it actually involves multiple independent 
systems, which may not be causally linked (Garfinkel et al. 
2016a). If this latter view is correct, then it may be that 
individuals with ASD show diminished interoceptive accu-
racy on one domain, but not another domain. Experiment 1 
addresses these issues.
In Experiment 1, we gave 21 adults with ASD and 21 NT 
age- and IQ-matched comparison adults the classic heartbeat 
tracking task to measure cardiac interoception, as well as a 
version of a task used by Murphy et al. (2018) to test res-
piratory interoceptive accuracy. We included control tasks 
designed to assess the extent to which alternative, compen-
satory strategies might be used by individuals with ASD 
to succeed on the two interoception tasks in the absence of 
underlying interoceptive competence. We also administered 
measures of mindreading, depression and anxiety to allow 
full characterisation of the sample and for the exploration 
of underlying cognitive/personality correlates of interocep-
tive accuracy. We predicted that adults with ASD would be 
unimpaired on both the cardiac and respiratory interoception 
tasks and that this would reflect truly undiminished intero-




The experiment was ethically approved by the School of 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of 
Kent (Ref: 201815259101245011). Twenty-one adults with 
ASD (8 female) and 21 NT comparison adults (6 females) 
took part in Experiment 1. Participants with ASD had an 
average age of 37.24 (SD 11.85; range 24–64 years) and NT 
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participants had an average age of 41.19 (SD 14.02; range 
24–65 years). Groups were matched in relation to verbal, 
performance and full-scale IQ (using the Wechsler Abbrevi-
ated Scale for Intelligence-II; Wechsler 1999), as well as age 
(see Table 2). All participants also completed the Autism-
spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001b), and two 
mindreading tasks; the reading the mind in the eyes task 
(RMIE; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001a) and the animations task 
(Abell et al. 2000).
The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001c) is a widely used self-
report questionnaire that measures reliably ASD traits, in 
both general and clinical populations (e.g., Reed et al. 2011; 
Williams et al. 2018). In this questionnaire, individuals are 
asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with each of 
the 50 statements (e.g., “I find social situations easy”) that 
the questionnaire comprises, using a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “definitely agree” to “definitely disagree”. 
Scores range from 0 to 50, with higher scores indicating 
more ASD traits. A score of ≥ 26 is the cut-off point that 
denotes clinically significant levels of autism traits (Wood-
bury-Smith et al. 2005).
The RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001c) is a reliable and 
widely used measure of mindreading abilities in general 
and clinical populations (e.g., Domes et al. 2007). Partici-
pants are presented with a series of 36 photographs showing 
the eye-region of males and females, and they are asked 
to choose among four different options the emotion/feeling 
that best describes the mental state of the depicted person. 
Scores range from 0 to 36, with higher scores indicating 
better mindreading abilities.
The Animations task, which is based on Heider and Sim-
mel (1944), required participants to describe interactions 
between a large red triangle and a small blue triangle, as 
portrayed in a series of silent video clips (Abell et al. 2000). 
Four clips were apt to invoke an explanation of the trian-
gles’ behaviour in terms of epistemic mental states, such as 
belief, intention, and deception. These clips comprise the 
“mentalizing” condition of the task and were employed in 
this experiment. Each clip was presented to participants on 
a computer screen. After the clip was finished, participants 
described what had happened in the clip. An audio recording 
of participants’ responses was made for later transcription. 
Each transcription was scored on a scale of 0–2 for accuracy 
(including reference to specific mental states), based on the 
criteria outlined in Abell et al. (2000). Eighty percent of 
transcripts were also scored by an independent rater. Inter-
rater reliability was excellent according to Cicchetti’s (1994) 
criteria (intra-class correlation = 0.86). Accuracy (propor-
tion) among ASD and comparison participants is shown in 
Table 2.
Participants in the ASD group had received verified 
diagnoses in line with standard criteria (APA 2000; World 
Health Organisation 1993). Diagnostic reports/letters were 
validated by researchers prior to testing. The Autism Diag-
nostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 2000), an 
in depth observational measure of ASD characteristics, was 
also administered by a research-reliable assessor to all mem-
bers of the ASD group. The ADOS and AQ were employed 
as indices of the severity of ASD features, and all partici-
pants met the relevant cutoff score on at least one of these 
measures. Six of the 21 participants with ASD did not score 
above the ASD cut-off on the ADOS (with scores of 6, 6, 
4, 4, 2, and 0, respectively). However, the ADOS does not 
have perfect sensitivity to ASD (for example, see Risi et al. 
2006) and a sub-threshold score does not over-rule a formal 
diagnosis. Thus, excluding participants on the basis of a sub-
threshold ADOS score would result in an unrepresentative 
sample of participants. Most important, when we excluded 
Table 2  Experiment 1 
participant characteristics, 
matching statistics and 
secondary measures
VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full scale IQ, TAS Toronto alexithymia scale, AQ autism quo-
tient, ADOS autism diagnostic observation schedule, RMIE reading the mind in the eyes, BMI body mass 
index, STAI state/trait anxiety inventory, BDI Beck Depression Inventory 2
ASD (n = 21) NT (n = 21) t p d BF10
Age 37.24 (11.85) 41.19 (14.02) 0.99 0.33 0.30 0.45
VIQ 105.52 (11.44) 104.29 (10.99) 0.36 0.72 0.11 0.32
PIQ 105.71 (17.62) 105.14 (14.95) 0.11 0.91 0.03 0.31
FSIQ 106.00 (13.51) 105.52 (12.67) 0.12 0.91 0.04 0.31
TAS 61.52 (11.75) 44.33 (9.91) 5.13 < 0.001 1.58 > 100
AQ 33.00 (8.20) 14.95 (5.49) 8.38 < 0.001 2.59 > 100
ADOS 9.29 (4.80) – – – – –
RMIE (prop. accuracy) 0.70 (0.16) 0.77 (0.10) 1.77 0.04 0.52 1.95
Animations (prop. accuracy) 0.57 (0.31) 0.71 (0.19) 1.82 0.04 0.54 2.11
BMI 26.17 (5.87) 26.13 (4.57) 0.26 0.98 < 0.01 0.30
STAI 95.62 (21.02) 72.29 (19.11) 3.77 0.001 1.16 52.29
BDI 15.33 (11.91) 9.14 (7.89) 1.99 0.05 0.61 1.42
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participants with ASD who scored under the ADOS cutoff 
of seven, the between-group differences in experimental task 
performance remained almost identical in substance; that 
is, all p values that were significant when these six partici-
pants were in included remained significant when they were 
excluded, all p values that were non-significant remained 
non-significant, and all effect sizes remained in the same 
order of magnitude (small/medium/large). Therefore, results 




Heartbeat Tracking Task In the heartbeat tracking task 
participants index finger was attached to a pulse oximeter 
(Contec Systems CMS-50D+; Qinhuangdao, China) which 
measured their heart rate. During the task they were asked 
to close their eyes and silently count how many times they 
felt their heart beat in between two auditory tones. This 
procedure was repeated over four different time intervals 
(25, 35, 45 and 100  s) and presented in a random order. 
Cardiac Interoceptive Accuracy (cIA) was calculated as: 
1—(|recorded number of heartbeats—counted number of 
heartbeats|)/((recorded heartbeats + counted number of 
heartbeats)/2), (Garfinkel et al. 2015). This provided a value 
between − 1 and 1 for each time interval, with more positive 
values indicating better cIA. The materials and procedures 
for the heartbeat tracking task were the same as used in pre-
vious studies of cIA in ASD (Schauder et  al. 2015; Shah 
et al. 2016; Mash et al. 2017; Nicholson et al. 2018).
Blow Comparison Task In the blow comparison task, par-
ticipants exhaled into a peak flow meter (Mini-Wright) at a 
particular level of effort (a “target blow”) and then attempted 
to reproduce exactly the intensity of the target blow in a sec-
ond exhalation 15 s later (a “comparator blow”). Success-
ful reproduction of the target blow required participants to 
monitor and perceive the feeling of their target blow as they 
were engaged in producing it, with the aim of remembering 
and recreating that feeling when producing the comparator 
blow. Therefore, in order to perform the task one needed to 
encode the bodily effort/exertion during the target exhala-
tion and remember that feeling in order to recreate it, both 
of which rely on interoceptive information relating to the 
feeling of ones’ breath.
Participants completed a total of 9 target blows (and 
9 corresponding comparator blows), three blows at each 
of three intensities (weak, medium, and firm). Prior to 
beginning a practice the experimenter provided the par-
ticipant with an example of each of the three intensities 
by demonstrating each themselves. For example, for the 
weak intensity trials, participants were instructed to “blow 
into the peak flow meter with a weak intensity, like this. 
Now you try.” After demonstrating each intensity level, the 
experimenter checked that the participant could feel the 
difference between the levels before beginning the prac-
tice, which included the participant trying each intensity 
themselves. On each trial, the measurement of the target 
exhalation was hidden from view during the task so that 
participants could only rely on their internal feeling of 
exhaling to complete the subsequent comparator blow. 
Trials at each intensity were blocked together, such that 
all weak trials were performed sequentially, all medium 
trials were performed sequentially etc. Order of trial inten-
sity was counterbalanced across participants. Trials were 
blocked according to effort intensity to avoid an overly 
high burden on long-term memory for the target blow. 
Had trials not been blocked by intensity, a participant 
might have, for example, given a firm target blow, fol-
lowed immediately by an equivalent comparator blow, but 
then not produced their second or third firm comparator 
blows for several minutes. The reliance on memory for 
one’s firm target blow from minutes before would have 
risked turning the task into a test of long-term memory as 
much as, or more than, a test of interoception. By block-
ing trials according to intensity level, participants should 
have been able to maintain awareness of internal effort in 
working memory, thus making the task a valid measure of 
interoception.
Between the different intensity blocks a 40 s break was 
given to participants to allow their breathing to return to 
normal. Respiratory interoceptive Accuracy (rIA) was calcu-
lated in the same manner as the cIA: 1 − (target blow − com-
parator blow)/((target blow + comparator blow)/2).
Control Tasks
Time Estimation Following the same procedure as in the 
heartbeat tracking task, participants were asked to count 
the number of seconds of three different time intervals (19, 
37, and 49 s), with the order of intervals being randomised 
across participants. Accuracy was quantified using the same 
formula used to measure cardiac interoceptive accuracy. If 
performance on the heartbeat tracking task is the result of 
time estimation rather than interoception then one would 
predict a positive correlation between the two measures. If, 
however, no such correlation exists it supports the idea that 
participants are not merely counting during the heartbeat 
tracking task. Moreover, time estimation task performance 
can be covaried with the heartbeat tracking task in order 
to assess the extent to which performance on the task can 
explain performance on the heartbeat tracking task and how 
this differs between groups.
 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
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Memory Task Between-group differences in rIA could be 
explained by between-group differences in short-term mem-
ory for internal effort. Therefore, we employed a memory 
control task with a parallel structure to the blow compari-
son task in order to compare performance on the two tasks 
and to ensure that short-term memory could not explain rIA 
performance. In the memory task participants were asked 
to press the “b” key of a keyboard down, producing a tone 
and then release the key whenever they wanted to (with the 
caveat that it must be for more than a second so that partici-
pants could not merely touch the key very briefly, therefore 
potentially making the comparison press easier). Subse-
quently, they were asked to repeat the task with the aim of 
pressing the button down for the same length of time, as they 
previously did. They were instructed to rely solely on their 
memory to recreate the duration of the prior tone and not to 
count seconds. Participants completed one practice trial and 
then nine experimental ones. Again accuracy was measured 
using the same formula as the interoception and time esti-
mation tasks. If performance on the blow comparison task 
is the merely the result of short-term memory for external 
cues, then performance on the blow comparison task should 
positively correlate with performance on the memory task.
Self‑report Measures
In addition to the experimental interoception tasks and min-
dreading tasks we also included a series of self-report meas-
ures in order to assess levels of depression (Beck Depression 
Inventory 2; Beck et al. 1996), anxiety (State-trait Anxiety 
Inventory; Spielberger et al. 1983), and alexithymia (Toronto 
alexithymia scale; Taylor 1984) in our groups. Additionally, 
we also calculated each participant’s body mass index. Each 
of these measures is described in the Online Supplementary 
Material. Including these measures allowed the chance to 
explore the association between each of them and interocep-
tive accuracy on the experimental tasks. However, this was 
not the primary purpose of the study and, to retain the focus 
on between-group effects, we report the results from these 
correlations in the Supplementary Material.
Statistical Analyses In addition to null hypothesis signifi-
cance testing, we also conducted Bayesian analyses to pro-
vide an estimation of the relative strength of findings for one 
hypothesis over another (i.e., the alternative hypothesis over 
the null, or vice versa). This allows a more graded interpre-
tation of the data than is possible using P values or effect 
sizes alone (e.g., Dienes 2014; Rouder et al. 2009). Accord-
ing to Jeffreys’ (1961) criteria, Bayes factors (BF10) > 3 
provide firm evidence for the alternative hypothesis (with 
values > 10, > 30, and > 100 providing strong, very strong, 
and decisive evidence, respectively) and values under 1 pro-
vide evidence for the null (with values < 0.33 providing firm 
evidence).  BF10 values can be considered to reflect the like-
lihood that the alternative hypothesis is more likely to be 
true than the null hypothesis. Hence, a  BF10 of 3 suggests 
the alternative hypothesis is three times more likely to be 
true than the null hypothesis. Bayesian analyses were con-
ducted using JASP 0.8.1 (JASP Team 2016).
Results
Interoception Task 1: Heartbeat Tracking Task
The average cIA score was 0.58 (SD 0.32) in the ASD group 
and 0.56 (SD 0.30) in the NT group, a difference which was 
statistically small and nonsignificant, t(40) = 0.18, p = 0.86, 
d = 0.06,  BF10 = 0.31. The mean cIA score for each time 
interval on the HTT in each group is shown in Fig. 1. A 2 
(group: ASD/NT) × 4 (time interval: 25 s/35 s/45 s/100 s) 
ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect of Group, 
F(1,40) = 0.32, p = 0.86, 휂2
p
= 0.001 , and a nonsignificant 
Group × Time Interval ienteraction ffect, F(3,120) = 0.02, 
p = 0.99, 휂2
p
= 0.001 . Therefore, in line with most other 
studies of IA in ASD, there was no significant difference 
between groups in levels or patterns of performance on the 
heartbeat tracking task.
To assess the impact of levels of alexithymia on car-
diac interoception we split the ASD group into those over 
(n = 13) the threshold for the diagnosis of alexithymia (> 60 
on TAS20) with those under (n = 8) the threshold (< 60). The 
average cIA score was 0.60 (SD 0.16) in the under thresh-
old group and 0.56 (0.40) in the over threshold group, a 
difference which was statistically small and nonsignificant, 
t(19) = 0.26, p = 0.80, d = 0.13,  BF10 = 0.41. Therefore the 
presence or absence of alexithymia could not explain ASD 
performance on the heartbeat tracking task.
Time Estimation Control
The average time estimation score was 0.80 (SD 0.20) in the 
ASD group and 0.74 (SD 0.17) in the NT group, a difference 
which was non-significant, t(40) = 1.01, p = 0.32, d = 0.31, 
 BF10 = 0.46. Performance on the time estimation task was 
non-significantly associated with the heartbeat tracking task 
in either the ASD group, r = -0.02, p = 0.92,  BF10 = 0.27, or 
the NT group, r = 0.19, p = 0.42,  BF10 = 0.37. Therefore, in 
neither group did it appear that performance on the heart-
beat tracking task reflected merely time estimation ability. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the null group finding can be 
explained by use of alternative, compensatory strategy use 
among participants with ASD. Indeed, after controlling for 
performance on the time estimation task, the main effect 
of Group on heartbeat tracking task performance remained 
small and non-significant in an ANCOVA, F(2,39) = 0.11, 
p = 0.92, 𝜂2
p
< 0.001.
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Interoception Task 2: Blow Comparison Task
The average rIA score was 0.88 (SD 0.04) in the ASD group 
and 0.89 (SD 0.04) in the NT group, a difference which 
was statistically small and nonsignificant, t(40) = 0.50, 
p = 0.62, d = 0.15,  BF10 = 0.33. The mean rIA score for 
each intensity on the blow comparison task for each group 
is shown in Fig. 2. A 2 (group: ASD/NT) × 3 (intensity: 
weak/medium/firm) ANOVA was conducted. Neither the 
main effect of Group, F(2,40) = 0.29, p = 0.59, 휂2
p
= 0.007 , 
nor the Group × Intensity interaction effect, F(2,80) = 2.20, 
p = 0.18, 휂2
p
= 0.052 , was significant. Therefore, there was 
no significant difference between groups in either levels or 
patterns of performance on the blow comparison task.
Once again to assess the impact of levels of alexithymia 
on respiratory interoception we split the ASD group into 
those over (n = 13) the threshold for the diagnosis of alex-
ithymia (> 60 on TAS20) with those under (n = 8) the thresh-
old (< 60). The average rIA score was 0.88 (SD 0.06) in the 
under threshold group and 0.88 (0.04) in the over thresh-
old group, a difference which was statistically small and 
nonsignificant, t(19) = 0.13, p = 0.90, d <0.01,  BF10 = 0.40. 
Therefore, the presence or absence of alexithymia could not 
explain ASD performance on the blow comparison task.
Memory Control Task
Due to experimenter error, one NT participant failed to com-
plete the memory task. The average memory task score was 
0.85 (SD 0.07) in the ASD group and 0.87 (SD 0.09) in the 
NT group, a difference which was small and non-significant, 
t(39) = 0.57, p = 0.57, d = 0.18,  BF10 = 0.31. Performance on 
Fig. 1  Cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy scores for each time 
period for each group during the 
HTT in experiment one. Error 
bars represent SEM
Fig. 2  Respiratory interoceptive 
accuracy scores for each level of 
intensity for each group during 
the BCT in experiment one. 
Error bars represent SEM
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the memory task was non-significantly associated with the 
blow comparison task in either the ASD group, r = 0.17, 
p = 0.47,  BF10 = 0.35, or the NT group, r = 0.23, p = 0.32, 
 BF10 = 0.44. Therefore, it is unlikely that the null group find-
ing can be explained by use of alternative, compensatory 
strategy use among participants with ASD. Indeed, after 
controlling for performance on the memory control task, 
the main effect of Group on blow comparison task perfor-
mance remained small and non-significant in an ANCOVA, 




cIA was nonsignificantly correlated with rIA in both the 
ASD group, r = 0.06, p = 0.80,  BF10 = 0.28, and the NT 
group, r = 0.17, p = 0.46,  BF10 = 0.35, suggesting that intero-
ception related to the heart and interoception related to lungs 
are independent processes and not mediated by a unitary 
system.
Secondary Measures
Figures concerning the comparison between groups on the 
secondary measures can be found in Table 2.
Association Analyses
A series of bivariate and partial correlations were conducted 
to explore the association between interoceptive domains, 
ASD traits/features and the other secondary measures. Given 
that the results from association analyses were not a central 
focus the current study, combined with the fact that none of 
the key correlations was significant, means we report the 
data in Online Supplementary Material.
Experiment 1: Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 support previous research by 
Nicholson et al. (2018) and others that indicates no differ-
ences between autistic and non-autistic adults in cardiac 
IA (Schauder et al. 2015; Shah et al. 2016; Nicholson et al. 
2018). Importantly, Bayesian analyses consistently sug-
gested that the data strongly supported the null hypothesis. 
We confirmed in the current experiment that such a lack of 
significant between-group difference in cIA is unlikely to be 
the result of unmeasured confounds or alternative strategy 
use. Rather, cardiac interoceptive accuracy appears to be a 
relative strength for autistic adults, in line with theories that 
suggest awareness of own physiological states is undimin-
ished in ASD (e.g., Grainger et al. 2016; Lind 2010; Uddin 
2011; Williams et al. 2018). To confirm that this strength 
was not only in the cardiac domain, we also employed a 
novel measure of respiratory interoception and, again, 
failed to observe a between-group difference in interocep-
tive accuracy.
These findings add to the growing literature investigat-
ing interoception in ASD, and challenges theories claiming 
interoceptive impairments lie at the heart of the disorder 
(Quattrocki and Friston 2014). One possibility that might 
save this latter theory and explain contradictory findings in 
the literature is if interoception impairments are apparent in 
children with ASD, even if not adults with ASD. As Wil-
liams and Bowler (2014, p. 5) note,
“we should never forget that the clinical picture we see 
among individuals with a diagnosis of ASD represents 
a particular point in an atypical developmental trajec-
tory, in which both the clinical features and any puta-
tive underlying factors may be in a process of change.”
It may be that early impairments in interoception resolve, 
or are compensated for, by the time autistic individuals reach 
adulthood. Of the three studies looking at cardiac intero-
ception in children with ASD, two found no between-group 
differences in cIA (Schauder et al. 2015; Mash et al. 2017). 
However, the most recent study, by Palser et al. (2018), 
found a large interoceptive impairment in children with 
ASD, relative to comparison children. Therefore, in Experi-
ment 2 we ran the same cIA task in children with and with-
out ASD in order to add to the existing studies investigating 
interoception in ASD, and to test the hypothesis that any 
impairment associated with the condition may be develop-
mental in nature and therefore more pronounced in child-
hood. Based on the findings from Experiment 1 and our own 
theoretical inclinations, we predicted that children with ASD 
would be unimpaired on the heartbeat tracking task and that 
this would reflect truly undiminished interoceptive accuracy 




21 children with ASD (5 female) and 21 NT comparison 
children (6 females) were recruited to take part. Participants 
with ASD had an average age of 12.95 (SD 1.49; range 
10–16 years) and NT participants had an average age of 
12.70 (SD 1.17; range 24–65 years). Groups were matched 
in relation to verbal, performance and full scale intelligence, 
as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelli-
gence-II (Wechsler 1999), as well as age. Participants com-
pleted the same two mindreading tasks used in Experiment 1 
(see Table 3). Firstly, participants completed a child version 
of the RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001c). The child version 
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of the reading the mind in the eyes included 28 photographs 
from the adult version of the task with the four word options 
representing simplified more basic language. Secondly, par-
ticipants did the same animations described in Experiment 
1. For the animations task all transcripts were also scored 
by an independent rater. Inter-rater reliability was excellent 
according to Cicchetti’s (1994) criteria (intra-class correla-
tion = 0.85). For both mindreading tasks proportion scores 
were used to allow easy comparison with experiment one. 
Participants in the ASD group had received verified diagno-
ses in line with standard criteria (APA 2000; World Health 
Organisation 1993). The Social Responsiveness Scale was 
also completed for each participant by a parent or caregiver.
Materials and Procedures
Participants from each group completed the same heart-
beat tracking task and time estimation tasks used in 
Experiment 1. We did not include the Blow Comparison 
Task in Experiment 2, because we had limited time with 
the children in Experiment 2 to complete testing (unlike 
with the adults in Experiment 1). Therefore, and made 
the strategic decision to include only the heartbeat track-




The average cIA score was 0.40 (SD 0.53) in the ASD group 
and 0.69 (SD 0.18) in the NT group, a difference which was 
moderate-to-large and statistically significant, t(40) = 2.34, 
p = 0.028, d = 0.72,  BF10 = 2.51. The mean cIA score for 
each time interval on the heartbeat tracking task in each 
group is shown in Fig. 3. A 2 (group: ASD/NT) × 4 (time 
interval: 25 s/35 s/45 s/100 s) ANOVA was run on this data. 
The main effect of Group was significant, F(1,40) = 5.47, 
p = 0.024, 휂2
p
= 0.12 , but the Group × Time Interval interac-
tion effect did not approach significance, F(3,120) = 0.25, 
p = 0.86, 휂2
p
= 0.006 . Therefore, the ASD group showed 
diminished interoceptive accuracy across all time intervals, 
rather than with any particular duration.
Table 3  Experiment 2 
participant characteristics and 
matching statistics
VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full scale IQ, SRS social responsiveness scale, RMIE reading 
the mind in the eyes
ASD (n = 21) NT (n = 21) t p d BF10
Age 12.95 (1.49) 12.70 (1.17) 0.60 0.55 0.19 0.35
VIQ 107.95 (9.11) 108.71 (11.22) 0.24 0.81 0.07 0.31
PIQ 105.71 (17.62) 105.14 (14.95) 0.16 0.87 0.03 0.31
FSIQ 111.76 (14.90) 112.48 (14.13) 0.20 0.85 0.05 0.31
SRS 83.90 (10.02) 46.38 (11.26) 11.41 < 0.001 3.52 > 100
RMIE (prop. correct) 0.70 (0.08) 0.72 (0.08) 0.71 0.48 0.25 0.37
Animations (prop. correct) 0.44 (0.23) 0.71 (0.17) 4.40 < 0.001 1.34 >100
Fig. 3  Cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy scores for each time 
period for each group during the 
HTT in experiment two. Error 
bars represent SEM
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Time Estimation Control
The average time estimation score was 0.81 (SD 0.15) in the 
ASD group and 0.88 (SD 0.10) in the NT group, a difference 
which was nonsignificant but which was moderate in magni-
tude, t(40) = 1.75, p = 0.09, d = 0.54,  BF10 = 1.01. Crucially, 
however, performance on the time estimation task was non-
significantly associated with the heartbeat tracking task in 
both the ASD group, r = 0.002, p = 0.99,  BF10 = 0.27, and 
the NT group, r = 0.11, p = 0.60  BF10 = 0.30. Thus, while the 
NT group were significantly better at perceiving their heart-
beat and numerically better at estimating time than the ASD 
group, the two measures failed to correlate significantly with 
each other within groups suggesting that the two measures 
were not tapping the same underlying process in either 
group, and that individuals were not merely counting dur-
ing the heartbeat tracking task. The significant main effect 
of Group on heartbeat tracking task performance remained 
significant after controlling for time estimation performance, 
F(2,39) = 4.80, p = 0.03, 휂2
p
= 0.11 . Indeed, the main effect 
of Group on heartbeat tracking task performance remained 
significant (with no change in the associated effect size) after 
controlling for all other background variables in addition to 
time estimation ability (age, VIQ, PIQ, and average heart 




A series of bivariate correlations were conducted to explore 
the association between cIA, mindreading performance and 
SRS. Given that the results from association analyses were 
not a central focus the current study, combined with the fact 
that none of the key correlations was significant, we report 
the data in Online Supplementary Material.
Experiment 2: Discussion
Interoceptive accuracy performance on the heartbeat track-
ing task was significantly lower in the ASD group than in the 
NT group, providing evidence that cIA is impaired in chil-
dren with ASD. This is in line with a recent study by Palser 
et al. (2018) who also found a group of ASD children had 
diminished cIA on the same task compared to comparison 
participants. The current results could not be explained by 
other strategies such as counting, as there was no significant 
correlation between time estimation and performance on the 
heartbeat tracking task in either group. Moreover, even when 
controlling for time estimation performance their remained 
a significant difference in cIA between groups emphasising 
that time estimation ability could not explain the differences 
in performance on the heartbeat tracking task.
General Discussion
Taken together, the results from experiments 1 and 2 add 
to the growing literature on interoception in ASD and 
provide a potential developmental explanation for how 
interoception changes across the lifespan in this condi-
tion. The findings partly support theories that reference 
the importance of altered interoceptive processing in the 
development of the ASD phenotype (Quattrocki and Fris-
ton 20 2014). However, the results also suggest that intero-
ceptive difficulties in childhood may resolve by adulthood 
in people with ASD (unlike difficulties with mindreading 
and emotion processing, which remain impaired across the 
lifespan in ASD).
In Experiment 1, we replicated previous research find-
ings of no cardiac interoceptive impairment in ASD adults 
(Shah et al. 2016; Mash et al. 2017; Nicholson et al. 2018), 
irrespective of the extent to which participants manifested 
alexithymic traits (cf. Nicholson et al. 2018). While one 
previous study (Garfinkel et al. 2016b) found an impair-
ment in ASD adults, this study did not match groups for 
IQ, which leaves open the possibility that the finding was 
the result of between-group differences in general cog-
nitive ability, rather than between-group differences in 
diagnostic status. While the current study found a clear 
medium-to-large cardiac interoceptive impairment in ASD 
children (d = 0.72), which is in line with another recent 
study by Palser et al. (2018), two other studies of cardiac 
interoception in children with ASD have observed no such 
impairment (Schauder et al. 2015; Mash et al. 2017). One 
issue to consider here is that, as highlighted by an anony-
mous reviewer of the manuscript, the average interoceptive 
accuracy of neurotypical children in Experiment 2 was 
higher than the average interoceptive accuracy of neuro-
typical adults in Experiment 1. While post hoc analysis 
showed that this difference was non-significant, t = 1.71, 
p = 0.10, d = 0.52,  BF10 = 0.95, the fact that neurotypical 
children were even numerically superior to neurotypical 
adults is somewhat surprising. Perhaps these control chil-
dren were unrepresentatively able, which produced artifi-
cial group differences in interoceptive accuracy that would 
not have been observed if “super controls” had not been 
employed. This is a possibility, but we guarded against this 
by ensuring the groups were matched for background vari-
ables, such as IQ and time estimation ability, which might 
have influenced interoceptive accuracy. The group differ-
ence in interoceptive accuracy remained significant after 
age, IQ, time estimation ability, and average heart rate 
were controlled in an ANCOVA. If the control children 
showed higher levels of interoceptive accuracy because 
they were super controls, then we might reasonably have 
expected to see group differences reduced or eliminated 
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after controlling for other relevant variables, but this did 
not occur. When considering all these findings together, 
one interpretation is that there is heterogeneity in the 
cognitive profile of children with ASD and that cardiac 
interoception is impaired in only some children. However, 
whether such an impairment represents a core cognitive 
cause of ASD features is a matter for debate.
A number of theories have argued that emotional process-
ing relies on inferring the causes of interoceptive signals 
(Wiens 2005; Seth 2013; Barrett 2017), and neuroimaging 
studies of the link between interoception and emotion pro-
vide some evidence in favour of this view (Critchley et al. 
2004; Zaki et al. 2012). This fits when considering ASD, 
given that previous research has highlighted that difficulties 
in identifying and understanding emotions both in oneself 
and in others is a common cognitive-level difficulty in this 
disorder (Gaigg 2012; Uljarevic and Hamilton 2013; but see 
Williams and Happé 2010). If interoception is linked with 
emotion-processing development in neurotypical individu-
als, then early impairments interoception among children 
with ASD may underpin later (and persistent) difficulties 
with emotion-processing. In other words, it may be that 
a “decoupling” of interoception and emotion processing 
among some children with ASD results in emotions never 
being fully anchored within the body, making emotions dif-
ficult to understand in self and others across the lifespan 
even once interoception difficulties have resolved.
A related possibility concerning decoupling is that local 
interoceptive signals are not integrated together in a global 
sense, therefore restricting their influence on motivational 
and behavioural states which drive subsequent goal-directed 
action (Hatfield et al. 2019). This fits the pattern of weak 
central coherence often observed in people with ASD 
(Happé and Frith 2006), and suggests that interoceptive sig-
nals may be attended to by people with ASD in a more nar-
rowly detail-focused manner than neurotypical people tend 
to attend to them. From this perspective the decoupling of 
interoceptive processing may not be specific to its links to 
emotional information per se, but global processing on a 
more general level, including the inability for interoceptive 
signals to inform emotional processing, but also that these 
processes struggle to properly bind with other information 
sources such as memory, perception and decision making. 
Future research aimed at measuring interoceptive, emotional 
and other forms of cognitive processing within the same 
population could test the plausibility of this account, while 
also shedding light on the idea that the decoupling may be 
specific to emotional and interoceptive processing.
Another alternative possibility is that the process of 
building theories of emotions (or mental states, generally) 
is impaired in ASD independent of interoception difficul-
ties (e.g., Carruthers 2009; Williams 2010). This could also 
explain the findings that emotion-processing difficulties 
persist in ASD even after interoceptive difficulties have 
resolved, and also that emotion-processing abilities are not 
necessarily reliably associated with interoceptive accuracy 
(see Nicholson et al. 2018; also, the lack of a significant 
association in the current study). Future research should 
aim to unpick the developmental trajectories of both emo-
tional and interoceptive processing in children with ASD, 
and investigate how these trajectories compare to those in 
neurotypical children.
The current results also speak to other theories such as 
the alexithymia hypothesis (Bird and Cook 2013), given 
that neither cardiac nor respiratory interoceptive accuracy 
was significantly associated with number of alexithymic 
traits in participants who completed Experiment 1. Moreo-
ver, there were no significant differences in interoceptive 
accuracy between individuals with ASD who scored over 
the clinical threshold for alexithymia (n = 13) and those 
who scored under threshold (n = 8). These findings chal-
lenge any strong claim that alexithymia and interoception 
are inextricably linked. A caveat here is that sample size 
was relatively modest and so drawing conclusions from the 
results of association (or subgroup) analyses should be done 
with caution. Nonetheless, the sample size is very similar 
to the sample size in previous studies that have reported 
an association between the two abilities (see Table 2). The 
alexithymia hypothesis is a plausible theory that explains 
some of the existing findings in the interoception-, emotion 
processing- and ASD-related literature. The current find-
ings do not speak to all aspects of the theory and there are 
several aspects that may well be correct. The current findings 
suggest only that comorbid alexithymia does not appear to 
influence interoceptive abilities in adults with ASD as the 
theory predicts it should.
Aside from the contribution of the current results to our 
understanding of ASD, the results also have implications for 
theories of the structure of interoception. In particular, the 
finding that accuracy on the measure of cardiac interocep-
tion was not associated significantly with accuracy on the 
measure of respiratory interoception supports the suggestion 
that there may not be a unitary interoception faculty that 
processes all forms of interoceptive input (Garfinkel et al. 
2016a). The finding that measures of interoceptive accuracy 
in different domains are not associated significantly does not 
show that the outputs from independent low-level intero-
ceptive systems are not combined at a higher level of the 
processing hierarchy (e.g., at the level of integration or inter-
pretation). However, it does imply that at the level of moni-
toring these systems are distinct. This can inform futures 
studies that aim to measure both interoceptive monitoring 
and integration across multiple domains.
In conclusion, the current study suggests that interocep-
tive accuracy impairments may be present in children with 
ASD, but that these impairments resolve over time and are 
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absent by adulthood. This provides a developmental frame-
work for understanding interoception in ASD and suggest 
future research should focus on how interoceptive and emo-
tional processing relate to each other in children. Equally, it 
provides motivation for future studies aimed at improving 
interoception in childhood with the idea that this may have 
the potential to enhance the link between emotional pro-
cessing and interoception early on, which could improve 
emotional processing in ASD through development and into 
adulthood. These findings add to the growing literature on 
interoception in ASD and provide insight into strategies for 
future research.
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